

Notes on Holland on Keating;
5-2-12

Why was it a crisis?

Note: K's intent was a F.A., which would keep it from being a "crisis." (Force JFK to "eat it," as he had accepted Turkish missiles; and had backed down from Berlin deadline.

Makings of a humiliation (and a crisis)

(Use the elements of my theory of crises as Faits Malaccomplis (see Suez)

--Repubs were making an issue of SU buildup; calling for strong(er) action; accusing the Administration of lying, concealing the nature of the buildup (Keating implied strongly!)

--JFK made commitment precisely (?) because he believed it unlikely that K had such an intention; the commitments of Sept. 4 and Sept. 16 [go into chronology of SU deployment] were a) to nail that down, and (b) to look tough and determined in face of Repub criticisms, without actually doing anything.

--He believed it unlikely because of Bolshakov falsehoods; his belief in credibility of Bolshakov and K and the importance to K of a trustworthy relationship with JFK, taking him seriously as a partner;

Was Keating correct? 6? IRBMs? (October 10) "universally construed to be offensive"? (Turkey?) (Hughes: four sites, not six. IRBM or MRBM?
(He claimed to be positive that the White House and State Department had the same information. Lying! Or asleep.

[See my notes? What WAS the reporting that led to the Oct. 14 flight? When did it come in? Oct. 9? Before Keating Oct. 10 statement? Was—not—McGeorge Bundy unaware of it—because of PSALM? (did that fool him as well as JFK?!)—when Bundy told Meet the Press on Oct. 14, "we have no evidence"? (I.e., was he lying, or really unaware?)

(The U-2 flew against some reservations, because of the SAMs (? Like Powers?) and the China event: as well as weather earlier. It wouldn't have flown without some serious indication: of where, as well as whether there were missiles. It wasn't just a "routine" flight. And see SAC and CIA dispute, and earlier flyover.

Check when Nitze says he was convinced there were missiles!